Abstract-The objective of fault-tolerant computing systems is running user applications. It is always less than or equal to the to provide an error-free operation in the presence of faults. The system availability and can be computed from it by subtracting system has to recover from the effects of a fault by employing the portion of time that the system is executing the above certain recovery procedures like program rollback, reload, and mentioned tasks. restart, etc. However, these recovery procedures, result in interruptions in the system's operation, thus reducing the availNote that the application-oriented availability is different ability of the system for user applications. Fault-tolerant systems from the computational availability as defined in [3]. Compufor critical applications include, therefore, standby spares that tational availability is an appropriate measure in cases where are ready to replace active modules which fail to recover from the the computational capacity of the system is varying. For effects of a fault. A standby spare may also be used to replace a module suffering from frequent fault occurrences resulting in too systems in which a failure results in an interruption in the user many repetitions of the recovery process, in order to increase the service but does not change the computational capacity of the availability of the system for user applications. system, the measure of application-oriented availability is
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In this case a module switching policy is needed indicating appropriate.
upon a fault occurrence, whether to retry a failing module or
The difference between the application-oriented availability switch it out and replace it by a spare, considering the remaining mission time and the probability of a system crash. A module and the classical system availability measure may be quite switching policy for dynamic redundancy systems is presented in substantial, e.g., a frequently occurring failure in an active this paper and the improvement in application-oriented availabil-module of a computing system may result in a large number of ity due to the use of this policy is illustrated. time-consuming error-recoveries and resynchronizing procIndex Terms-Application-oriented availability, deterioration esses. A situation like this might have an intolerable impact on models, failure rate, fault tolerance, modular redundancy, the performance of a critical real-time control system (e.g., in module switching policy, recovery, standby spare.
aerospace applications like vehicle guidance systems). In these
I. INTRODUCTION
cases it might be beneficial to replace such a module with a T HE purpose of incorporating fault-tolerance into a spare one if available, in order to achieve a higher application-I computing system is to minimize or even eliminate service oriented availability.
interruptions which are due to faults. A fault-tolerant comput-
To study these phenomena we have to consider the possible ing system should not be just a system producing error-free Consequently, we distinguish here between application-physical defects in the hardware that manifest themselves oriented availability and system availability. The latter is intermittently in an unpredictable manner (in this class we may defined as the steady-state probability that the system is include data sensitive design errors [4] ). Transient faults are operational. We define the application-oriented availability as due to temporary environmental conditions (such as temperathe steady-state probability that the system is operational and is ture, humidity, vibration, power fluctuation, electromagnetic fields, etc.) which may persist for an unpredictable period of (i.e., intermittent and transient ones) constitute the majority of to system crashes for which the system becomes inoperational the faults occurring in computing systems [12] , [13] . Hence, for the remaining mission time. Based on this we define a recovery capabilities for nonpermanent faults which do not system cost function which is the expected cost of all system require giving up hardware resources prematurely, are usually down-time periods (more accurately, periods at which the user built into these systems. Various recovery techniques are used applications are not being executed) and derive an optimal nowadays in fault-tolerant computing systems, like instruction switching policy that minimizes this cost function. retry, program rollback, reload, and restart, etc.
[1], [11]-Clearly, the optimal module switching policies for various [13] . None of these techniques can be effective against all structures of fault-tolerant computing systems are not necespossible faults. Hence, several recovery steps are employed in sarily the same. In this paper we concentrate on dynamic support of one another to increase effectiveness [1], [8], [11]-(standby) redundancy fault-tolerant systems. Similar policies [13] .
for other configurations of fault-tolerant systems are being Due to the complexity of the recovery problem, each investigated. recovery procedure has its deficiencies and may fail and cause A module replacement policy for dynamic redundancy a system crash [1], [12] , [15] . In some systems, recovery systems has been presented in [7] . However, it has been deficiencies account for as much as 35 percent of the down-assumed there that the switched-out module is considered time [15] . Even if the recovery procedure is successful, an faulty and discarded. The drawback of such a decision is that overhead time is involved. First, there is a detection time the premature retiring of a module which might still have a between fault occurrence and fault detection and then, there is useful life service may unnecessarily reduce the system's the recovery time including initialization and synchronization mission time. of the failing module [5], [6], [11] .
Consequently, we consider here the switched-out module as Usually, the information processing performed by the a possible spare which will be used, if and only if no system during the detection time (and even before that if a "perfect" spare is available. Under this assumption the reload and restart operation is needed) is contaminated and reasons against switching out the module (which is subject to must be repeated. Thus, a cost to the system is associated with frequent nonpermanent fault occurrences) are the possibility of every recovery procedure activated. The cost of a single a system failure during reconfiguration due to imperfect application of a recovery procedure might be low; however, a coverage (e.g., a fatal switching failure) and the overhead time frequently occurring nonpermanent fault will considerably associated with reconfiguration. reduce the application-oriented availability of the system.
The optimal switching policy for a dynamic redundancy Moreover, the rate of some intermittent faults like those system is derived in Section III after the underlying mathematcaused by deteriorating or aging components, gradually ical model is outlined in Section II. Numerical examples are increases until they become permanent. Their transition into then presented in Section IV. Section V is devoted to possible solid faults may take from a few minutes to several months extensions of our mathematical model and final conclusions during which the frequency of their occurrence increases are presented in Section VI. intolerably. Such a situation should be avoided on time.
In addition, too many applications of a recovery procedure will undoubtedly increase the probability of an unsuccessful Consider a computing system, one of whose modules has m recovery leading to a system failure. Consequently, in some standby spares ready to be switched in upon failure of the cases it may be worthwhile to switch out the module which is active module. The active module is subject to fault occursubject to nonpermanent fault occurrences and reconfigure the rences and we adopt here the viewpoint that fault occurrences system. obey a Poisson process [4] -[9], [11]- [14] . Although the What is needed, therefore, is a module switching policy that failure rate is treated as a constant in most related works, it is will indicate the kind of operation to be taken by the system recognized that it may be a function of time and even some whenever a module fails, i.e., should we retry the module that module parameters. It is apparent in particular, that as time has failed or maybe switch it out and replace it by a spare. This goes on certain types of faults are more likely to occur and the module switching policy should optimize some system cost status of the module may be deteriorating. function. The application-oriented availability measure as One way to model the deterioration process of modules is to defined above is concerned only with the portion of time that assume that the failure rate increases with the occurrence of the system is operational and running user applications. This failures. The simplest model in this direction is one that measure does not make a distinction between several brief distinguishes only between modules that had no failures, the interruptions in service (which may in some cases be harm-failure rate of which is X0, and the modules that had at least less), and a single interruption period equaling in length to the one failure-whose failure rate is 1 (> X0). Restated, the sum of the shorter ones. The latter might be disastrous to failure rate of a module is initially X0 and after the first failure critical real-time applications, it increases to X1, and remains so thereafter. A module with Hence, instead of maximizing the application-oriented failure rate Xo (X1) is said to be in state 0(1). This dichotomized availability we attempt to optimize a more complex version of deterioration model is analyzed in this work in detail. More this availability measure. Namely, we assign one cost per time general deterioration models are discussed in Section V. unit to brief periods of service interruption and a different cost When a failure occurs we have two possible actions at our per time unit to longer interruptions, paying special attention disposal: we can retry the failed module in order to bring it back to operation, or else replace it by a spare-if one is still Consequently, this convention simplifies the expressions to available. (1) operation with the new active module while the module that where has been switched out from operation is to be tested. This testing procedure, which does not result in any cost since no h(r) (u)= Cr+rC u+(1 -r)[(l -p)D,N(u) system down-time is involved, either completes successfully, if the fault is not permanent, or fails. In the former event, the +p{C5+sCfU+(l -s)DO N(u)}] probability of which we denote by 1 -p, the retired module becomes a standby spare, while otherwise it is discarded and is the expected cost in (0, u) if there is a failure at u upon the group of spares is decreased by one.
which a retry action is taken and afterwards an optimal policy The alternative operation, i.e., retrying the module that has is followed, and failed, incurs cost Cr and has the following outcomes. Either a crash occurs, the probability of which is denoted by r, and a h (s) (u)= C, + sCfu penalty of Cf is paid for any unit of uncompleted mission time.
Or, a crash does not occur, then with probability 1 -p the
retry operation proceeds and the system resumes operation, or is the expected cost in (0, u) if there is a failure at u upon else (with probability p) the fault is permanent, the retry which a replacement action is taken and afterwards an optimal operation fails and the failed module must be replaced. The policy is followed.
costs and consequences of this forced replacement are as
The latter two expressions hold for k . 1, while for k 0 described above only that now the switched-out module is to (i.e., no spares at state 0 are available) we have be discarded right away (no further testing is needed), i.e., the size of the group of spares is necessarily decreased by one. Obviously, when a replacement is made, either immediately DO,N(t) = | X1 e-i (tu) min {h (u); h 0Nu)} du (2) or following an unsuccessful retry operation, the module chosen for replacement is one in state 0, i.e., an unused one, where as long as this type of module has not been yet exhausted. Moreover, the optimal order is invariant with respect to k and (1 -br)X0 / CC\ N, a result that will prove to be of much use later. + Cft-(Cjr C ) (e-r1t-e-ot) (4) The derivation of the optimal policy is detailed in the (X0-4rXl)cbr \ XI / Appendix where closed-form expressions for the cost funcThe expressions in (3) and (4) provide us with the necessary tions are derived. Having closed-form expressions simplifies starting points for the solution of the recursive optimality the reevaluation of the cost function which might be needed equation (2) . Once the functions Di l(t), **, DIN have also whenever a module fails (and the system recovers from the been computed, they provide us, in turn, with the boundary effect of the failure) since some system parameters may functions for the solution of the recursive optimality equation change upon a failure, e.g., number of spares and state of (1). ii) DkN(t) iS continuously increasing in t,
The first example chosen for presentation is a system with a
Since we have only two actions at failure, the optimal policy single standby spare which has, when the mission starts, a optimal (n = 0, 1, ). This can be presented graphically as Xj(0, 1) and Xj(l, 1).
follows.
In Fig. 1 The improvement in system cost due to the adoption of the values are plotted in Fig. 1 . It is interesting to note that in Fig. optimal policy is illustrated in Fig. 3 . The improvement is 1 D,(t) > DOO(t), i.e., for the given system parameters, defined by 1 -D,1(t)/D(sw)(t) and similarly for D(RT)Q} having a single operational module (with no spare) with a For example, the cost is reduced by as much as 40 percent if failure rate X0 is preferable to having two modules (one in instead of switching out the operational module (and replacing operation, the other a standby spare), both with a higher it by the spare) upon failure, one follows the optimal policy failure rate XI. The opposite has been observed in other that calls for a retry operation when the mission is about to be examples.
over.
In Fig. 2 the cost (in system down-time) incurred when the The deterioration model that we have employed requires the optimal policy is followed, is compared to the system cost for estimation of the failure rate ratio X1/Xo. This ratio is clearly two other policies according to which the same decision difficult to accurately estimate and, therefore, the sensitivity (switch out or retry) is made throughout the mission time. In of the optimal policy to this ratio has to be analyzed. As an this figure D(sw-)(t) denotes the cost if the operational module example of such a sensitivity analysis we have calculated the is always switched out and replaced upon failure. D(RT)(t) is policy switching points for the above system parameters but defined similarly for a retry operation. The system cost with two different estimated failure rate ratios namely, X1/X0 associated with the optimal policy is clearly lower than those = 2 and X1/X0o = 15. For each of these two values we have associated with the nonoptimal policies, calculated the cost function D, (t) for a system with a failure Here, two policy switching points were computed, X1(0, 1) 4 showing that the system cost increase due to inaccurate *X = 0.162 and X1(1, 1) * =-0.202, where the optimal estimation of the failure rate ratio is almost negligible policy calls for switching out of the operational module upon compared to the reduction in cost due to the adoption of the failure (and replacing it by the spare) in the time interval near optimal policy (Fig. 3) . the end of the mission. The reason for this decision is the The above calculations were repeated for a second set of lower immediate cost incurred when replacing the operational parameters, i.e.. remaining mission time is large, the long-term cost of a system the same type of operation throughout the mission time [the crash is of concern and, therefore, the optimal policy calls for operation is determined by (6)], one might gain by following a retry operation which has a lower probability of system crash this policy. In Fig. 6 two such cases are depicted. One has the (r). Fig. 5 depicts the improvement in system cost due to the same system parameters as in Set I except that Cr/Cs = 0.5, adoption of the optimal policy. Here, too, the improvement is we call it Set III. The second, Set IV, is similar to Set II except quite substantial illustrating the effectiveness of the optimal that CS/Cr = 2. For example, the lower curve in Fig. 6 shows policy. the improvement in system cost if the optimal policy that calls The importance of following the optimal policy is not for a replacement upon failure throughout the mission time is restricted to cases where finite values for the policy switching followed, instead of the nonoptimal policy of always retrying points exist. Even in cases where the optimal policy calls for the failing module. Fig. 6 shows that cost reductions higher than 50 percent might be expected when selecting the right The last term in (9) and (10) should be replaced as was done policy.
for (8) if ko = 0 or ko = k, = 0. Similar changes should be In summary, the above presented numerical results illustrate done with the next to last term in these two equations. the reductions in system cost one may expect when optimal
The models considered hitherto may look in certain situamodule switching policies are applied.
tions too rigid due to the assumption that the failure rate increases at every single failure. The following simple model V. MORE GENERAL DETERIORATION MODELS extension allows much more flexibility in this aspect. We can The dichotomized deterioration model can be generalized in add control parameters to the model and make the change of a natural way by assuming that the failure rate increases at the failure rate, at the failure epoch, depend on the relation every failure epoch and does so until the Mth failure after between these parameters and the time that has elapsed since which it does not change any more. A module can, therefore, the last failure of the module. The motivation behind this be in states: 0, 1, * M where its failure rate is Xo, X1, * *, approach is that frequent failures indicate worsening of the XM, respectively. Thus, Xo corresponds to the failure rate of module status, whereas sparsed failures may be interpreted as modules that have not yet failed, XI corresponds to modules "normal" or even an indication of improvement (a Bayesian that have failed exactly once, and so forth.
revision mechanism of the failure rate has similar complicaThe mathematical approach that has been developed for the tions although in a different conceptual framework). special case M = 1, i.e., the dichotomized deterioration To illustrate these ideas consider again the dichotomized model, can be readily extended to this more general situation. model and assume that a module which had a failure rate X0 It, however, requires the enlargement of the state space to an (XI) prior to the failure will have a change to failure rate XI (N0) M + 1 dimensional one since a counter for the number of if the time that has elapsed since the last failure is less (more) spares in each of the possible M + 1 states is needed.
than "a" ("b"); otherwise no change of failure rate occurs.
Specifically, define first a vector k = (ko, (7) and (11) Optimal module switching policies have been introduced in 1k1 +P(l-SDk~I,k1,N Ithe paper and one such policy has been developed for dynamic '°k k + l,N(U) +pl-sDo-,l (u) ( (2) where in h psu) we set BO,N(U, X) for DeN(U).
The above procedure with the necessary algebraic modifica-tions, is repeated and as a result the sequence Xj(0, N); i = 1, To obtain XI(k, N) we, as for k = 0, define Bk,N(V, x) as 2, * is generated and in the process the function DIN(t) is obtained.
Bk,N(V, x)=AkN(X)eX1 (v) Once D N(t) is known we can compute DON(t) by using the equation = 0, one finds the policy switching point XI(k, N). If X1(k, DIN(t) = XIe-xI(`u)hkiNv(u) du N) is fini; e, we denote Bk,N(t) = Bk,N(t, XI(k, N)) and proceed to compute X2(k, N). We define, as for k = 0,
